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Abstract 
 
Turnout as the most frequent form of political participation is often supposed to be linked to a 
relevant degree of political information of citizens. Non-voting on the other hand, is often 
assumed to be a decision caused by indifference or uninformedness. These stereotypes 
notwithstanding, there may be good reasons for informed citizens not to cast a vote, just as 
uninformed citizens may have good reasons to actually do cast a vote. This paper tries to 
combine two different views of the effects of political information on electoral participation: 
(a) the commonplace argument of participatory studies that informed citizens are more likely 
to take part in the political process and (b) the remark of partisan dealignment approaches that 
electoral behaviour of modern and cognitive mobilized voters is less stable and predictable. 
Heteroskedastic Probit models of electoral participation in the European Parliament Election 
1994 demonstrate that political information increase the likelihood of turnout and decrease the 
predictability of the decision at the same time. 
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1. Two Effects of Political Information 
 
Empirical studies of political participation frequently revealed that the likelihood 
of turnout as well as the likelihood of participation in general is increased by political 
information (e.g. Milbrath, 1965; Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Palfrey & Poole, 1987). 
According to traditional argumentation, information heightens stability of political 
attitudes, it allows for distinctive party preferences, and therefore increases the probability 
of turnout. Furthermore, well informed respondents feel not only more competent to vote 
but are also more likely to have positive evaluations towards the democratic process, what 
also might mobilize them to turnout (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1954; 
Campbell et al., 1960). 
Studies of ‘electoral change’, on the other hand, demonstrate that traditional 
patterns in electoral behaviour are dealigning, to a certain extent as a result of increasing 
levels of cognitive mobilization in recent decades.1 Turnout was high when social 
constraints and party loyalties were still active but became in recent decades more variable 
and dependent on specific circumstances of an election (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et 
al., 1992).2 In this sense, political informedness also has further implications for the 
choice of whether citizens cast a vote or abstain: politically informed respondents do not 
simply follow longstanding loyalties but re-consider costs and benefits of casting a ballot 
in each election again.3 Presumably, they are more sensitive to the specific context of an 
election, like the closeness of the race, the possibility of coalition governments or political 
scandals. The central hypothesis of this paper is that political information not only 
increases the likelihood of turnout as it is usually argued, but that informed citizens also 
                                                 
1 Increasing educational levels and easy accessible political information by modern mass media are often 
mentioned in this respect (Dalton et al., 1984).  
2 In addition to this, labelled by the term of the ‘participatory revolution’, scholars state that the increase in 
political informedness of electorates broadened the repertoire of political participation, especially to 
unconventional forms of participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Kaase, 1984; Fuchs, 1991). It is argued that 
highly mobilized citizens increasingly discover electoral abstention as a way to express political preferences or 
protest effectively. (Kleinhenz, 1995) 
3 Examples for stable turnout caused by longstanding loyalties could be party attachments but also civic duties. 
Voters participate in elections because they feel obliged to fulfil their duties as ‘good’ citizens or party 
supporters (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Almond & Verba, 1963). 
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base their decision to turnout on more considerations, which makes their less predictable 
and more uncertain.4 
The hypothesis is general in its scope and should therefore be tested across 
different societies and different levels of electoral behaviour. The European Election 
Study 1994 (EES’94)5 and the Dutch National Election Study 1994 (NES’94)6 are suitable 
data sources in this respect. The assumption will firstly be tested for turnout in European 
elections in a pooled model across 12 European countries.7 Secondly, the results of 
turnout in European elections will be compared with participation in national and local 
elections, as illustrated by the single country case the Netherlands. The Dutch sample of 
the EES’94 and the NES’94 appear highly comparable since all three elections were held 
between March and June 1994. Besides, starting from European elections is also sensible 
for the reason that they are commonly described as low information elections (Blumer, 
1984).8 Thus, effects of political information are presumably less apparent in European 
                                                 
4 As will be elaborated later, uncertainty is conceptualised by the residual variance of statistical models 
explaining turnout. It is therefore expected that models of turnout produce more residual variance for well-
informed- than for less-informed respondents. There are two reasons possible why the decision to turnout or 
abstain may become less predictable or uncertain: either considerations which are central for the explanation of 
turnout among well-informed respondents are omitted in standard models of turnout, or, the decision of well-
informed respondents is more random. Although the first explanation seems more plausible and is adopted in 
this paper, two arguments can be found in the literature, which support the explanation of information-generated 
randomness. According to Zaller (1992), instability is due to an overload of information, which remains 
unstructured in most cases. Even though Zaller made his argument with respect to attitude stability over time, the 
underlying idea may also apply to the decision to participate in the democratic process. Another possible 
explanation for decision-variability of informed persons is given by psychological studies of what is called the 
‘tolerance of ambiguity’. Perhaps, uninformed respondents tend to make decisions consistent with given 
knowledge and to avoid deviations during choice processes. Informed respondents on the other hand show more 
often inconsistencies between considerations and choice. This may be explained by the acceptance of conflicting 
opinions in a complex decision making process. Informedness increases possibly the confidence in the own 
decision and in turn increases the likelihood that ambiguous decisions are made (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995).      
5 The analyses of this paper are based on the 1st post-election survey of the EES’94. The data are obtained in a 
Union-wide, nationally representative mass survey administrated by telephone immediately after the European 
Parliament Election of 1994. For more detailed information and question wordings see the homepage of the 
EES: http://shakti.trincoll.edu/~mfrankli/EES.html 
6 Analyses are based on the post-election survey of the Dutch National Election Study of 1994. For more 
information on the survey see Anker & Oppenhuis (1995). 
7 Another possible data source providing data on the international comparison of electoral behaviour would be 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The EES seems here preferable because it contains more 
variables on turnout. Besides, CSES focuses on a variety of institutional country differences, which possibly 
influence individual behaviour. Validating an individual level hypothesis across countries is therefore rather be 
obtained under less contextual variation of European elections. 
8 Oppenhuis et al. (1996) describe electoral behaviour in 1st order national elections as driven by head and in 2nd 
order European elections as driven by either heart  or boot depending on (dis -)satisfaction. The notion of 1st and 
2nd order elections refers to the observation that voters tend to express evaluations of national politics also in 2nd 
order European elections rather than to respond to circumstances of the European Election itself (Reif & Schmitt, 
1980; Schmitt & Mannheimer, 1991; Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2001). 
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elections than in other forms of political participation, which provides a tough basis for 
testing the hypothesis. 9 
 
 
2. Design 
 
This paragraph firstly has the aim to outline the construction of variables included 
in the model of turnout in the European parliament election of 1994 and secondly to 
explicate how uncertainty in choice processes can be tested empirically. 
The selection of independent variables follows previous studies of turnout in 
general and European elections in particular (Oppenhuis, 1995; Franklin et al., 1996; 
Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2001). The model includes variables for the socio-demographic 
background of respondents10, party adherence11 and campaign mobilization12. 
Furthermore, a dichotomous variable for compulsory voting13 controls for contextual 
variation in this respect and a variable of EU approval14 reflects the evaluation of the 
European Union in general. 
Measuring political information is a task that is, due to the complexity as well as 
the latent form of the construct, not straightforward and moreover continuously under 
debate (Converse, 1964; Klingemann, 1979; Luskin, 1987). In the literature, different 
                                                 
9 Nie and Verba (1975) describe voting compared to other modes of political participation as less information 
demanding. Therefore, voting itself is a tough basis for testing the assumption of the uncertainty of participation. 
10 To keep tables manageable, effects of individual characteristics age, class, church attendance, union 
membership and urbanisation are summarized in the ‘socio-demographic-effect’ variable. The variable contains 
linear predictions of turnout in the European election of 1994 of those social characteristics. The so called y-hat 
approach does not disturb the estimation of other independent variables in the overall model but combines the 
effects that need not necessarily be distinguished. In accordance to previous analyses, it turned out that age, 
class, church attendance, union membership, and residence in a rural area increase the likelihood of turnout. 
(compare for example Milbrath (1965) pp 110 ff)    
11 ‘Party adherence’ is measured by a four point scale of (1) no -, (2) weak -, (3) moderate -, and (4) strong party 
adherences. 
12 The additive 4 point scale of ‘Campaign Mobilization’ is constructed by three dichotomous variables of 
awareness of the European Election campaign with regard to (a) newspapers -, (b) TV and radio -, and (c) family 
and friends. The applied Mokken measurement model estimates a scalability measure of those three items of 
H=0,47 for the model of all 12 EU member states, weighting the data with equal importance of the included 
countries. Separate country analyses of the scale result in comparable scalability measures. H-measures between 
0,3 and 0,4 are usually seen as weak scales, between 0,4 and 0,5 as moderate scales and H-values greater than 
0,5 are usually supposed to reflect a strong underlying continuum. Mokken scaling was obtained by MSP 
(Mokken Scale Analysis for Polychotoumous Items). For information on MSP see Debets & Brouwer (1989) and 
for more detailed descriptions of the method see Mokken (1971) and Molenaar (1982). 
13 Compulsory voting in European elections can be found in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Luxemburg. 
14 ‘EU Approval’ is measured by a 5 point scale constructed by 4 dichotomous items. The items are (a) whether 
the EU is a good thing, (b) whether the EU is beneficial for owns own country, (c) whether the respondent is in 
favour of the European Unification, and (d) whether the respondent is sorry for EU dissolution. Mokken scaling 
estimates scalability of H=0,66 in the overall model. The overall model was, again, weighted with equal 
importance of the 12 EU member states. 
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measures based on different indicators can be summarised under the term ‘political 
information’.15 I will use the term as a collective of all those concepts.16 Assuming that a 
unidimensional latent variable of the political information -level of respondents exists, it 
was tested for scalability of several indicators of the trait using a Mokken measurement 
model.17 As it turned out, only interest in politics and the ability to answer political 
knowledge questions can reliably be added up to a unidimensional scale, which will in the 
following analyses be used as measure for ‘political information’.18 
Political information presumably does not only consist of different elements but 
depends also on political domains. Alongside general political informedness, respondents 
might be informed in issues that are of high salience for them. High general political 
informedness not necessarily implies high informedness with regard to the political issue 
of interest and vice versa. This may particularly be of importance in European Elections, 
where EU-specific informedness is usually assumed to be exceptionally low. Therefore, 
effects of political information on turnout in European elections will be measured by a 
variable of general19-, and a variable of EU-specific20 informedness of citizens. As it 
                                                 
15 Previous examples of measuring political knowledge, sophistication, conceptualisation, awareness or 
involvement are based often on indicators like education, political interest, attention to political issues, issue 
familiarity, self- and party placements on ideological scales, political knowledge, consumption of political media 
or the stability of opinions. Although different measures and different terms are used, with respect to effects on 
political participation, this does in my opinion not always go along with differences in substantial interpretations. 
16 The term ‘political information’ is understood in this paper following Converse’s (1975) use of the term. He 
distinguishes three sources of informedness: the capacity, the willingness and the sophistication of citizens. The 
capacity encompasses the cognitive ability of respondents to process information in general. This dimension is 
mainly linked to the education and knowledge of respondents. The second dimension, the willingness, denotes 
the degree to which respondents consciously collect political information, like media usage but also the interest 
in politics. The third dimension, the political sophistication, describes the ability of respondents to link 
information to pre-existing political belief systems (PBS). “A person is politically sophisticated to the extent to 
which his or her PBS is large, wide-ranging, and highly constrained.” (Luskin 1987: 860)  Each of the 
dimensions contributes to what here is called ‘political information’ and using single indicators may therefore be 
too concise to cover the whole phenomenon. For example, high educational levels do not imply that those 
respondents necessarily make use of their capacities, nor does high attention to political issues imply that those 
respondents are able to make use of the information in terms of information processing or coherent political 
belief systems. A solution where different indicators of political information can be combined to a single scale 
seems therefore preferable (compare also van Deth & Elff, 2000; Zaller 1992: 333ff). 
17 I used variables of education, interest, knowledge and the ability of respondents to place themselves and the 
mayor parties on the left-right scale but also on mayor issues regarding European politics. Testing scalability was 
performed by several variations in the construction of indicators.  
18 This is a 3 point scale with (1) low informed respondents, who do not answer the knowledge questions 
correctly and are not interested in politics, (2) moderate informed respondents, who either fail answering 
knowledge questions correctly or are not interested in politics, and (3) high informed respondents, who answer 
the knowledge questions correctly and are interested in politics. For information on the measurement model see 
footnotes 19 and 20. 
19 The 3-point scale of ‘general political informedness’ consists of interest in politics and the ability to answer 
two political knowledge questions (naming the national minister of finance and the national minister of foreign 
affairs). All three groups are approximately of equal size. A scalability measure of H=0,37 was estimated. The 
overall model was weighted with equal importance of the 12 EU member states. 
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turned out, both variables are closely related and ‘EU specific informedness’ will 
therefore be controlled for ‘general informedness’.21 Hence, the variable of ‘relative EU-
informedness’ reflects the amount of EU specific information going beyond the general 
informedness of the respondent. 
As a result of the comparative perspective of the analysis, distributional effects of 
political information between electorates may disturb substantive findings. Controlling for 
those compositional effects in pooled models is necessary if political informedness 
impacts on turnout but political information are not equally distributed between regional 
units (McAllister & Studlar, 1992; Marsh, 2001). By splitting informedness in an 
individual- and a compositional effect, it should be prevented that systemic differences 
between countries are included unintentionally since the individual variable of 
informedness is distributed differently across clusters (Zorn, 2000). This is done by 
calculating the mean informedness of national electorates and subtracting this mean from 
the individual informedness of respondents. The between-country-information22 
encompasses different levels of informedness between electorates whereas the within-
country-information23 denotes the individual informedness relative to the country level of 
political information. Hence, the first varies solely across individuals and the second 
solely across countries. 
After defining relevant variables explaining electoral participation, the question is 
how effects of political information on the likelihood- and on the variability of turnout can 
be modelled empirically. As proposed in the literature, uncertainty in choice processes can 
be tested using heteroskedastic Probit models (Alvarez & Brehm, 1995, 1997; Alvarez, 
1997; Greene, 2001). In these kinds of models, direct effects of an independent variable 
on the likelihood of the choice can be estimated simultaneously with the effect of the 
variable on the residual variance of the choice.24 Behind this approach stands the idea that 
high residual variance within specific groups of the sample indicates that choice in those 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 The 3-point scale of ‘EU specific political informedness’ consists of interest in EU related politics and the 
ability to answer two political knowledge questions regarding the EU (naming the President of the European 
Commission and the European commissioner of the own country). The scalability measure is H=0,32. The 
overall model was weighted with equal importance of the 12 EU member states.  
21 ‘Relative EU specific information’ is a residual-variable of an OLS regression of general political information 
on EU specific information. General informedness and relative EU specific informedness are uncorrelated. In the 
overall model of all 12 EU countries, general political informedness explains 53% of the variance of the specific 
informedness. 
22 Between-country-informedness is the country mean of the informedness variable (Zorn, 2000). 
23 Subtracting the mean informedness in one country from the individual informedness. The mean of the ‘within-
country-informedness’ in each country is therefore 0. (Zorn, 2000). 
24 Both parts are also graphically divided in the tables reporting the results of the models in a choice-model and a 
variance-model. 
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groups is affected by more unobserved considerations than it is true for the rest of the 
sample.25 High residual variance is interpreted in accordance to other applications of the 
method as uncertainty or variability in decision processes (Alvarez & Brehm, 1995, 1997). 
Therefore it can be determined whether or not the amount of information increases the 
uncertainty of the choice to participate in the democratic process. If the hypothesis of this 
paper holds, political information should not only increase the likelihood of turnout but 
should also increase the residual variance of the choice. 
 
 
4. Results: Political Information and Turnout 
 
Table 1 provides results of the analysis of electoral participation in the European 
election of 1994. The analysis includes all 12 member states of the EU in one model and 
independent variables are standardized to produce comparable estimates in terms of effect 
sizes. The comparison between an ordinary Probit and a heteroskedastic Probit model has 
the aim to illustrate to what extent heterogeneity in standard Logit or Probit models may 
possibly produce biased estimates. In addition it shows that substantive interpretations of 
the relationship between political information and participation can therefore be distorted. 
 
                                                 
25 In regression frameworks the residual variance is often described as the sum of unobserved variables and the 
error variance. The assumption of homogeneity in the residual variance in this sense means that the number of 
unobserved considerations and the variance of the error are constant across respondents. To confirm the 
hypothesis of the paper that information increases the number of considerations in the choice what makes it less 
predictable, a significantly higher residual variance in the model should be observable for highly informed 
respondents. But as mentioned before, it is still unclear whether heterogeneity is caused by omitted variables or a 
more random choice, although the first explanation seems more plausible. 
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Table 1: Probit and Heteroskedastic Probit Models of Electoral Participation in the European 
Parliament Elections 1994 in an EU wide analysis with equal weight of the 12 EU 
member states (EES’94) 
 
 Probit Heteroskedastic Probit
 Beta 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
CHOICE MODEL: b     
Socio-Demographic Effect 0.327 0.016 0.312 0.016 
Party Adherence 0.187 0.016 0.176 0.016 
Campaign Mobilization 0.076 0.016 0.079 0.015 
EU Approval 0.052 0.015 0.049 0.015 
Compulsory Voting 0.451 0.017 0.473 0.020 
General Political Information Within Countries 0.221 0.015 0.256 0.018 
Relative EU Specific Information Within Countries 0.113 0.015 0.125 0.020 
Political Information Between Countries 0.034 0.015 -0.009 0.016 
Relative EU Specific Information Between Countries -0.088 0.012 -0.076 0.011 
Intercept 0.656 0.015 0.685 0.017 
VARIANCE MODEL: s      
General Political Information Within Countries - 0.080 0.024 
Relative EU Specific Information Within Countries - 0.010 0.025 
Political Information Between Countries - -0.141 0.027 
Relative EU Specific Information Between Countries - 0.024 0.022 
MODEL FIT     
- Log Likelihood -5547.758 -5283.134 
Heteroskedasticity Test: c2[4] - 47.69 
N 11163 11163 
 
First of all, the variance part of the heteroskedastic Probit model shows that 
individual general informedness actually affects the residual variance of the model 
positively - meaning that political information increase significantly the uncertainty of 
turnout. This confirms the central hypothesis of this paper that information not only adds 
to the likelihood of electoral participation, but also produces a more complex and 
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therefore less predictable choice.26 EU specific information does not have the same effect 
on the error variance. Apart from the individual level effect of informedness on the 
residual variance, political informedness of electorates generates a more certain choice 
process.27 
The highly significant c2-test of heteroskedasticity illustrates that the assumption 
of homogeneity in the residual variance, made by standard Logit or Probit models, is 
clearly violated. In contrast to OLS regressions where heteroskedasticity produces 
inefficient but still unbiased estimates, this holds not true for binary choice models where 
heteroskedasticity generates even inconsistent estimates (Alvarez, 1997). Whereas the 
ordinary Probit model estimates a positive effect of the general political informedness of 
electorates on the likelihood of turnout, the comparison with the heteroskedastic Probit 
model reveals that this effect is most likely an artefact of the method rather than a 
substantive result: unlike the Probit model predicted, the country-level of political 
information does not affect the likelihood of turnout significantly. This also fits more with 
the in several countries observed contradiction that turnout rates are declining while levels 
of cognitive mobilization are rising. Obviously, standard Probit models can produce 
inconsistent estimates due to significant heterogeneity. Modelling participation as 
suggested by heteroskedastic models is therefore not only useful from a conceptual 
perspective but might well also be a statistical necessity. 
Comparing effect coefficients of independent variables explaining the likelihood 
of turnout in the choice model shows that most of the variance reduction is accounted for 
by compulsory voting followed by social constraints and political information. Campaign 
mobilization and party adherences have a lesser impact on the decision to turnout. General 
information appears to be more important than EU specific information. This result in 
combination with the fact that EU approval also does not affect turnout decisively can be 
seen as a confirmation of previous observations that European elections are hardly 
affected by EU politics, but are more closely related to national political affairs (Schmitt 
                                                 
26 Significant heteroscedasticity effects can be found in separate country analyses in 4 out of 12 cases. 
27 This result is problematic for the central hypothesis of the paper and needs further explanation: why does the 
individual informedness increase- but the aggregate informedness reduce uncertainty? A possible explanation 
could be covariation with other contextual characteristics. One can think of a situation where institutional 
arrangements of countries increase the degree of political informedness and the turnout rate at the same time 
because both follow the same logic. Powell (1980), Jackman and Miller (1995) or Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) 
show that among other factors, competitiveness, proportionality and compulsory voting increase the turnout-rate 
across countries. Gordon and Segura (1997) on the other hand show- based on a partly similar argumentation- 
that exactly those variables increase the sophistication of electorates. Perhaps, the informedness of electorates 
covariates strongly with institutional settings that provide basis for clear party preferences and more predictable 
turnout. 
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& van der Eijk, 2001). What is worrisome for EU politics is the fact that the information-
level regarding the EU of electorates even decreases electoral participation in European 
elections of those electorates.28 
As mentioned before, European elections appear to be a tough test for information 
effects on turnout because they are as 2nd order elections often assumed to be low-
information-elections. Since turnout in 1st order elections can be described as more tactical 
and less expressive, direct effects of information on the likelihood- and information-
originated uncertainty of turnout are presumably more evident in 1st order national 
elections than in 2nd order national elections, such as European- or local elections. The 
replication of the results for turnout in national and local elections on basis of the Dutch 
National Election Study 1994 and the Dutch sample of the European Election Study of 
1994 has two objectives: firstly to validate the hypothesis of the uncertainty of turnout 
across different electoral levels and secondly to assess whether effects of information are 
more relevant in 1st than in 2nd order elections. Both surveys were conducted at almost the 
same time, since the Dutch national parliament- local- and European parliament elections 
all were held in spring 1994. Table 2 contains similar models of turnout for the three 
elections.29 
 
                                                 
28 This maybe an indicator for either a poor performance of EU politics or for negative media coverage of 
European issues. Either way, when public attention towards the EU causes a decline in turnout and when the 
individual level of EU-information and EU-approval only increase the likelihood of turnout marginally, it 
probably refers to democratic deficits of the European Union. (for the relationship between negative media 
coverage of the EU and the representation deficit see Peter & de Vreese, 2002) 
29 The models do not include variables on campaign mobilisation or approval since equivalent variables do not 
exist for either national or local elections. To allow for comparability of the results, the applied models contain 
only variables that presumably affect all three levels of electoral participation. The construction of the included 
variables follows the proceeding describes above. ‘Political information’ is measured by an additive scale of (a) 
interest in politics (1 very interested; 0 else) and (b) the ability of respondents to answer at least three out of four 
political knowledge questions correctly. (Here: recognising four politicians by pictures and naming the political 
functions of those politicians). A Mokken measurement model estimates a scalability of H=0,44 of both 
dummies. It may be objected that those knowledge questions are more closely related to national parliament- 
than to local or European elections. I tested the applied models therefore using a political interest score instead of 
the variable ‘political information’. But it turned out that substantive conclusion also hold for this indicator. 
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Table 2: Heteroskedastic Probit Models of Electoral Participation in National-, European- and 
Local Elections 1994 in the Netherlands, Dutch National Election Study 1994 
(NES’94) and Dutch sample of the European Election Study 1994 (EES’94) 
 
 
National Election 
(NES’94) 
European 
Election (EES’94) 
Local Election 
(NES’94) 
    
CHOICE MODEL: b    
 
Socio-Demographic Effect 
 
0.27 
(0.08) 
0.39 
(0.05) 
0.38 
(0.07) 
 
Party Adherence 
 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.17 
(0.05) 
0.25 
(0.07) 
 
Political Information 
 
1.51 
(0.54) 
0.19 
(0.05) 
0.37 
(0.21) 
 
Intercept 
 
2.27 
(0.30) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
1.12 
(0.09) 
VARIANCE MODEL: s     
 
Political Information 
 
0.49 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
MODEL FIT    
 
- Log Likelihood 
 
-131.62 -565.11 -273.20 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: c2[1] 
 
7.11 0.12 1.26 
N 694 920 683 
 
 
Comparing effects of political information on the variance model of electoral 
participation on different levels offers no evidence for a more variable choice of informed 
respondents in 2nd order European and local elections, but strong heteroskedasticity in 1st 
order national elections. It appears that uncertainty caused by political information is a 
phenomenon that depends largely on the form of participation. More demanding forms of 
participation in terms of political informedness or involvedness, presumably cause also 
uncertainty and unpredictability of decisions among informed citizens. Therefore it can be 
expected that information generated uncertainty is especially evident in participation in 
demonstrations, parties, or interest groups. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
All analyses show a similar pattern: although informed citizens are in general more 
likely to participate in elections, high levels of information also seem to cause variability 
in the decision. Presumably, this is caused by changes in the perception of turnout: 
informed citizens increasingly incorporate more considerations in their decision to 
participate or abstain in an election. It is argued that they increasingly regard both options 
as valid and weigh pros and cons of actually casting a ballot according the contextual 
situation of the election. This appears especially to occur in the more important 1st order 
national elections, whereas effects of information on turnout are less crucial in 2nd order 
elections, such as European parliament- and local elections. 
The connection between the two effects of information on turnout may also 
provide a different view on the contradictory finding of increases in educational levels and 
declines in turnout rates of whole societies. What can be expected from a trend to higher 
political informedness - according to the results of the paper - is an increase of the rate30, 
but also of the variability of turnout. Electoral participation will fluctuate more if citizens 
use abstention occasionally as an effective way to express political preferences. The 
results of the paper lead to the assessment that higher cognitive mobilization increases 
turnout levels potentially, but more importantly, enlarges also the range of possible 
turnout rates. As long as incentives are omitted for highly informed citizens to cast a 
ballot, turnout will be at the lower end of its potential. 
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